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PERFORMANCE-BASED REMEDIES: 
ORDERING FIRMS TO ERADICATE 
THEIR OWN FRAUD 
LAUREN E. WILLIS∗ 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-first century has brought with it new tools for influencing 
consumer behavior, and thus new tools for both fair sales practices and unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive means of parting consumers from their money.1 In the 
twentieth century, firms had two avenues for influencing consumers—
inexpensive but fairly uniform advertising delivered in mass media or salesperson 
pitches tailored for each consumer one at a time. In contrast, technology today 
allows firms to personalize their interactions with consumers in real time and at 
low cost. The firm can set its performance goals, such as maximizing profit or 
increasing market share, and then engage in rapid iterative testing of consumers’ 
responses to different designs of websites, apps, pricing structures, sales and 
return processes, and even products and services themselves. Computer analysis 
of the results of these design changes allows each firm to continually adapt its 
interactions with each consumer in pursuit of the firm’s goals.2 
Consumer-law enforcement today remains stuck in the twentieth century. 
Though there are many reasons for this, three stand out. First, enforcement 
resources have not grown with the scope of consumer fraud.3 Second, financial 
penalties have not increased to meet the scale of today’s defendants.4 Third, the 
injunctive relief ordered in these cases has changed little since the twentieth 
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1. Of course, the gap between swindling and selling has never been wide. See generally ARTHUR
LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING (1976). 
2.  See. e.g., Thomas H. Davenport, How to Design Smart Business Experiments, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Feb. 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/02/how-to-design-smart-business-experiments [https://perma.cc/8XPY-
N3NL]; Wes Nichols, Advertising Analytics 2.0, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/ 
03/advertising-analytics-20 [https://perma.cc/L3UK-XCN2]. 
3. In the interests of brevity, this article uses “fraud” to refer collectively to unfair, deceptive, or
abusive practices. 
4. In the interest of brevity, this article uses “defendants” to refer to both defendants in judicial
proceedings and respondents in administrative proceedings. 
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century. Typically, only two remedies are imposed to prevent defendants from 
continuing to defraud consumers: information injunctions, which require 
defendants to make or refrain from making particular representations, and 
practices injunctions, which enjoin defendants from committing specific acts. 
Both remedies are too narrow, uniform, and static to counter twenty-first century 
fraud. 
The first two reasons that consumer-law enforcement cannot keep pace with 
today’s fraud—inadequate enforcement resources and weak penalties—are 
essentially political problems. The third reason, ineffective injunctive relief, is the 
result of rote repetition of prior enforcement agency practice, perhaps tinged 
with disinterest in acknowledging past failure; this article provides some overdue 
reflection and imperative ingenuity. To address unfairness, deception, and abuse 
of consumers, this article advocates two performance-based remedies: confusion 
injunctions, which have been ordered at least once before in a consumer case, 
and consequences injunctions, which have long been used in other contexts. 
These remedies order defendants to eliminate the confusion and ill consequences 
induced by defendants’ fraud. To comply with these injunctions, defendants must 
reduce the confusion and ill consequences borne by their customers down to 
prescribed levels within a prescribed time period. Defendants bear the costs of 
demonstrating, through independent third-party audits, their compliance. 
Customer confusion and consequences injunctions are modeled on modern 
business management and marketing techniques. Rather than dictating the 
processes by which firms produce outcomes, performance-based remedies set 
performance goals and give firms the flexibility and the responsibility to meet 
those goals. Additionally, making defendants pay for their own performance 
audits internalizes the bulk of enforcement costs and frees enforcement agency 
resources to pursue other fraudsters. Moreover, the cost of compliance with 
performance-based remedies can serve as an additional fraud deterrent. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part II surveys recent revolutionary changes 
in the methods available to firms for influencing consumer behavior, for both 
good and ill. Part III catalogues and critiques the provisions typically found in 
remedial orders and consent decrees by which consumer law violations are 
resolved today. Part IV describes customer confusion and consequences 
injunctions and explains why today’s fraud demands these remedies. The article 
concludes that consumer law enforcement in the twenty-first century can be 
effective and cost-effective only by enlisting defendant firms to eradicate the 
effects of their own fraud.5 
  
 
 5.  In related work, I discuss how similar methods could be used in consumer protection regulation. 
See generally Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309 (2015); 
Lauren E. Willis, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Quest for Consumer 
Comprehension, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 74 (2017). 
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II 
TWENTIETH- AND TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY TOOLS FOR UNFAIRNESS, 
DECEPTION, AND ABUSE 
The techniques applied to influence consumer behavior—making arguments 
on the merits, appealing to emotions, invoking social norms, and requisitioning 
consumers’ limited perceptual and cognitive capacities—have changed little over 
the centuries.6 But, due to recent changes in technology, social practices, and 
business management, the methods used to deploy, hone, and redeploy these 
techniques have qualitatively changed. 
A. Twentieth-Century Fraud And Fair Sales 
In the twentieth century, firms marketed products and services through two 
channels: a salesforce or mass marketing. Both could be used for fair sales or for 
unfairness, deception, and abuse. Both have their advantages and disadvantages. 
The in-person, salesforce channel has at least three advantages. First and 
foremost, it allows for dynamic customization—the influencer can tailor the 
message and delivery to what the influencer knows and learns about the 
consumer’s situation, values, personality, and capabilities, and can change course 
as the consumer reacts to the influencer’s pitch.7 Second, the human-to-human 
connection of a live messenger can inspire feelings, moods, and social norms that 
affect consumer behavior. One salesperson advises, “Make a friend . . . . You 
can’t do it en-mass; you can’t do it by formula, by rote or by script. That’s why it 
works.”8 Third, to the benefit of firms engaged in fraud, these interactions are 
usually ephemeral and private, leaving little trace for enforcement authorities. 
The main disadvantage of one-on-one pitches by salespeople is the time and 
expense for all involved, which makes this channel worthwhile only for high-
profit-margin transactions. When Encyclopedia Britannica went from an 
expensive physical set of books to an inexpensive CD-ROM, its distribution 
switched from door-to-door sales to mass-market retailing.9 
Mass marketing channels allow marketers to reach many consumers for 
pennies apiece, meaning that they can profitably be used for low-margin 
transactions. But in the twentieth century, mass marketing could be tailored only 
crudely, for a few roughly-estimated demographic segments, and thus could not 
affect consumers as strongly as salesperson interactions. Further, twentieth-
century mass marketing changed slowly. A physically published advertisement 
 
 6.  See generally ROBERT CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (6th ed. 
2006) (recounting the techniques used to influence people). 
 7.  See, e.g., Steli Efti, 10 Steps For Giving A Convincing Sales Pitch, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/04/18/10-steps-for-giving-a-convincing-sales-pitch/#285d6d2f3e 
fe [https://perma.cc/D5DJ-NJLY]. 
 8.  Bob Phibbs, Retail Sales Training: 9 Ways To Get Better At Selling, THE RETAIL DOCTOR’S 
BLOG (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.retaildoc.com/blog/retail-sales-training-9-ways-to-get-better-at-selling 
[https://perma.cc/JYW7-DDYN]. 
 9.  PHILIP EVANS & THOMAS S. WURSTER, BLOWN TO BITS: HOW THE NEW ECONOMICS OF 
INFORMATION TRANSFORMS STRATEGY 2–4 (2000). 
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cannot be altered until the next edition of the publication. Packaging design can 
only be changed in the next production run of the product. In addition, mass 
communication and production methods leave a plain evidence trail—tangible 
copies or audio or visual recordings of the marketing. 
Both in-person sales and mass marketing can be used for fair advertising or 
for illegal practices. An example of in-person fraud is door-to-door sales of poor 
quality “home repairs,” made infamous in the movie Tin Men.10 An example of 
illegal deception in mass marketing comes from the case of Hawaiian Punch. For 
decades, the product was promoted using advertising and packaging that falsely 
implied that the beverage was made primarily from fruit.11 This mass deception 
was remarkably successful; in 1974, consumer testing showed that more than 80% 
of Hawaiian Punch purchasers falsely believed that Hawaiian Punch contained 
over 20% fruit juice.12 But the deception was also easy to detect; the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) merely examined Hawaiian Punch advertisements and 
packaging.13 
The methods used to develop sales techniques and marketing in the twentieth 
century were unscientific, slow, and crude by today’s standards. Individual 
salespeople might rely on stereotypes and salesperson lore,14 and refine their 
pitches through transaction-by-transaction trial and error.15 Mass marketing was 
likewise often built on stereotypes16 or “gut-instinct voodoo.”17 
Data-driven marketing development began in the twentieth century, but was 
hampered by then-existing limitations on data collection, storage, and analysis. 
Consumer testing of ad copy, showing advertisements to consumers and asking 
for their reactions, became increasingly common,18 but what consumers say they 
will do and what they actually do can diverge markedly.19 Market segments were 
defined by rough demographic data, such as gender, religion, income level, or zip 
 
 10.  TIN MEN (Touchstone Pictures 1987).  
 11.  In the Matter of RJR Foods, Inc., et al., 83 F.T.C. 7, *2–*3 (1973). 
 12.  Thomas C. Kinnear et al., Affirmative Disclosure: Long-term Monitoring of Residual Effects, 2 
J. BUS. POL’Y & MKTG. 38, 40 (1984). 
 13.  RJR Foods, 83 F.T.C. at *2. 
 14.  As one salesman puts it: “Every person who sets foot on a car lot is instantly “pre-qualified”—
judged—based on their car, their race, and their appearance.” Mark McDonald, Car Salesman 
Confidential: Race and Stereotypes in Car Sales, MOTOR TREND (July 24, 2015), http://www.motortrend. 
com/news/car-salesman-confidential-race-and-stereotypes-in-car-sales/ [https://perma.cc/8JVB-U2VA]. 
 15.  See, e.g., Phibbs, supra note 8 (advising salespeople to “[t]ake note of how various kinds of 
people react differently to sales approaches, and alter your techniques accordingly”). 
 16.  See, e.g., Charles R. Taylor et al., Portrayals of African, Hispanic, and Asian Americans in 
Magazine Advertising, 38 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 608 (1995). 
 17.  Lisa Morgan, 9 Reasons Why Personalized Marketing Still Isn’t Accurate, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/big-data-analytics/9-reasons-why-personalized 
-marketing-still-isnt-accurate/d/d-id/1323736?print=yes [https://perma.cc/BCS6-HKVM]. 
 18.  See, e.g., Richard W. Pollay, The Subsiding Sizzle: A Descriptive History of Print Advertising: 
1900–1980, 49 J. MKTG. 24, 34 (1986). 
 19.  See, e.g., Niraj Dawar, When Marketing Is Strategy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2013), https://hbr. 
org/2013/12/when-marketing-is-strategy [https://perma.cc/S92E-LJLP]. 
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code.20 Mass marketing advertisers could tailor their materials only grossly, such 
as for a magazine’s entire readership, a television show’s viewing audience, or a 
billboard’s passerby population. 
The biggest advance came in direct mail mass marketing, which pioneered the 
modern experimental, performance-based approach to marketing development. 
Even a single experiment can reveal ways to significantly affect consumers’ 
responses. One experiment with mass-mailed postcards advertising small loans 
found that adding a small photo of an attractive woman to the postcard increased 
men’s loan uptake by roughly the same amount as a 2% reduction in the loan’s 
monthly interest rate.21 Another example of the use of experimental methods, 
albeit used to hide information from customers rather than reaching them, comes 
from the telecommunications company AT&T. Before adding to the fine print of 
its customer contracts “a series of provisions designed to limit customers’ rights 
and remedies in the event of a dispute with AT&T,”22 the firm engaged in 
repeated performance-based testing, experimenting with the envelope, the cover 
letter, and the fine print itself until the firm hit upon a combination that would 
result in virtually no customers reading and understanding the new contract 
terms.23 
But data about consumer reactions to stimuli sent through the postal system 
trickled in slowly and physical production of new tangible media for each round 
of testing was costly. Moreover, statistical analysis methods most easily facilitated 
by existing computing power generally restricted testing to an examination of one 
variable at a time.24 Finally, the hierarchical business management practices 
common in the twentieth century meant that firms acted upon the incoming data 
through slow sequential human management decisions.25 
B. Twenty-First-Century Fraud And Fair Sales 
Technology in the twenty-first century gives those seeking to influence 
consumer behavior new tools that combine the strengths of the in-person sales 
approach with the strengths of the mass marketing approach.26 Marketing can be 
done on a mass scale at low cost, while simultaneously being dynamically 
customized for each target consumer and leaving only an opaque trail of 
 
 20.  See, e.g., Philip Kotler, From Mass Marketing to Mass Customization, 17 PLANNING REV. 10, 
12–13 (1989). 
 21.  Marianne Bertrand et al., What’s Advertising Content Worth? Evidence From A Consumer 
Credit Marketing Field Experiment, 125 Q.J. ECON. 263 (2010). 
 22.  Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 23.  Id. at 1134. 
 24.  See Gordon H. Bell et al., Experimental Design on the Front Lines of Marketing: Testing New 
Ideas to Increase Direct Mail Sales, 23 INT’L J. RES. MKTG. 309, 318 (2006). 
 25.  See, e.g., Ravi S. Achrol & Philip Kotler, Marketing in the Network Economy, 63 J. MKTG. 146, 
146 (1999). 
 26.  As one marketing services company explains, “[r]eal-time personalization is the process by 
which companies simulate the in-store process of customer interaction and engagement ... to drive [online 
sales].” Marketing Secrets - Real-Time Personalization, SELLIGENT.COM, http://www.selligent.com/ 
content/real-time-personalization [https://perma.cc/NDG2-JB4Y].  
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computer code. Alternatively called “data-driven marketing,” “personalized 
marketing,” or “real-time marketing,” it is all of these, and more.27 
The data driving marketing is obtained today not by slow tests using tangible 
media but by rapid, iterative, online tests. Social-networking service Facebook 
hosts thousands of experiments daily.28 Experimental redesigns of online and 
other electronic marketing can be accomplished with a few mouse clicks. Today’s 
data analysis methods are multi-factorial, meaning these experiments can 
examine many variables at once.29 
Testing is key, because which designs will be most effective is difficult to 
predict. Sometimes changes in content, format, and text have no effect on sales. 
In one study of credit card offers, personalized messages appealing to the 
consumer’s known interests produced no greater response rate than generic 
marketing.30 Sometimes, as explained in the well-known book Nudge, tiny 
changes have huge effects on consumer behavior.31 For example, one company 
changed its “ADD TO CART” button from blue to green and saw an immediate 
increase in sales of over 35%.32 Other changes have unexpected effects. In one 
case, moving a button from the top to the bottom of a webpage tripled the 
number of consumers who clicked the button.33 
Moreover, today’s data-driven experimentalist methods can be used to design 
more than marketing. Firms routinely test pricing structures to determine which 
generate the most profitable result, considering take-up, use, and income 
generation.34 The processes consumers use for opening and closing accounts, for 
buying and returning products, for accessing customer service, and the very 
structure of products and services themselves can all be all designed and 
redesigned using the same methods.35 The CEO of financial conglomerate 
Capital One has described the credit card business as “a scientific laboratory 
where every decision about product design, marketing, channels of 
communication, credit lines, customer selection, collection policies and cross-
 
 27.  E.g., Susan Taplinger, DMA and Neolane Study Reveals Digital Channels are Crucial for Real-
Time Marketing, THE DMA (July 17, 2013), https://thedma.org/news/dma-and-neolane-study-reveals-
digital-channels-are-crucial-for-real-time-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/E5NU-6J4N] (using and quoting 
marketers using all of these labels).  
 28.  Eytan Bakshy, Big Experiments: Big Data’s Friend for Making Decisions, FACEBOOK (Apr. 3, 
2014), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-science/big-experiments-big-datas-friend-for-ma 
king-decisions/10152160441298859/ [https://perma.cc/VD2Z-EYM2]. 
 29.  E.g., Bell et al., supra note 24, at 309–10. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008). 
 32.  Neil Patel, Click Here: 16 Hacks That’ll Get Your Call-to-Action Buttons Clicked, NEIL PATEL 
BLOG (Nov. 15, 2015), http://neilpatel.com/2015/11/15/click-here-16-hacks-thatll-get-your-call-to-action-
buttons-clicked/ [https://perma.cc/7DTQ-SFTN]. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  E.g., Bell et al., supra note 24, at 309–10.  
 35.  See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 2 (suggesting that business organizations “as a whole” will shift 
to “a test-and-learn mind-set”); Peter VanRysdam, The New Blurred Lines Between Marketing and 
Development, 352 INC. (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.352inc.com/blog/the-new-blurred-lines-between-
marketing-and-development/ [https://perma.cc/KV9M-PKJV]. 
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selling [can] be subjected to systematic testing using thousands of experiments.”36 
Continual experimentation and computer analysis of results allows firms to keep 
up as consumers’ beliefs, knowledge, norms, habits, and environments evolve. 
Methods of measuring the influence of each redesign on consumer behavior 
remain imperfect, but are improving as technology enables firms to track 
individual consumers over time to observe their actual purchases rather than 
looking only at mediators such as product recall or emotional valence.37  
Evidence of experimentation could be less accessible when performed in the 
virtual environment rather than the physical one. Records of the aforementioned 
AT&T tests of postal mailings were discovered in litigation and used to 
substantiate a claim for unfair and deceptive practices.38 Comparable records of 
online marketing tests might more likely be swept into the sea of electronic data, 
drowning enforcement agencies before they find it. 
Thus, firms’ interactions with consumers today share another feature of one-
on-one sales—ephemeral evidence. A human salesperson’s forearm can 
“casually” cover information that could reduce the probability of a sale, while 
leaving scant evidence of deception and an easy defense of unintentional action. 
Similarly, a drop-down screen on a website could cover crucial information and 
be difficult to attribute to intentional action by the firm.39 These website and app 
designs intended to unfairly manipulate consumers are common enough to have 
a name, “dark patterns.”40 
A recent example of a dark pattern is online payments system operator 
PayPal’s alleged use of various features of webpage design to trick consumers 
into signing up for and using PayPal Credit when they thought they were using 
their existing free PayPal transaction accounts.41 PayPal also automatically 
enrolled these customers in electronic billing, and the emails containing the bills 
were treated as junk by common email filters, such that many customers never 
saw the bills. Only months later, when dunned by a bill-collector, would the 
customer realize that she had been signed up for a credit account and now owed 
months of interest and fees to PayPal.42 
This fraud continued for many years yet might only have been apprehended 
due to the sheer volume of PayPal customers—over fifty million in the United 
States.43 Only a small fraction of customers needed to complain to draw the 
 
 36.  Davenport, supra note 2 (quoting Capital One CEO Rich Fairbank). 
 37.  WILLIAM D. WELLS, MEASURING ADVERTISING EFFECTIVENESS 319–21 (2014). 
 38.  Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 39.  Manuel Da Costa, Ryanair’s New Website – Still Hiding Some Mean Tricks with Dark Patterns, 
DIGITAL TONIC, http://www.digital-tonic.co.uk/digital-tonic-blog/ryanairs-new-website-still-hiding-
mean-tricks-dark-patterns/ [https://perma.cc/LGR3-24WB] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
 40.  See Saul Greenberg et al., Dark Patterns in Proxemic Interactions: A Critical Perspective, PROC. 
OF 2014 CONF. ON DESIGNING INTERACTIVE SYS. 523, 524 (June 2014). 
 41.  Complaint at ¶¶ 28–29, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. PayPal, No. 1:15-cv-01426 (D. Md. May 
19, 2015) [hereinafter PayPal Complaint]. 
 42.  Id. at ¶¶ 30–31. 
 43.  More Payment Options Means More Sales, GLOBALPAYMENTS, https://www.globalpayments 
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attention and resources of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 
A firm with fewer customers or a shorter-duration fraud might not attract 
scrutiny. 
Increasingly, algorithms analyze the data generated by experiments and then 
dictate the marketing, sales and return processes, pricing permutations, and 
product and service designs to deploy.44 Machine-learning reduces expense and 
increases speed,45 but also attenuates the involvement of the influencer’s 
intentions and potentially obscures any evidence trail more so than when a 
human is more intimately involved. 
The experience of the technology company Google with its advertising 
algorithm provides an example of potential dangers posed by machine control of 
firm activity. Google displays ads based in part on a user’s search terms, and 
which search terms trigger which ads depends on the click behavior of prior users. 
Advertisements selling criminal records first appeared on computer user screens 
randomly. However, over time as more users clicked on those advertisements 
when searching for black race-associated names than when searching for white 
race-associated names, future users who searched for “black” names were more 
likely to be shown advertisements for criminal records than users who searched 
for “white” names. Until an academic researcher discovered it,46 Google 
presumably did not even know that its algorithm created a racially biased pattern 
of advertising. 
A chain of events similarly unmediated by illegal intent could easily lead to 
other types of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. As one marketing blog 
explains: 
There is a tension for marketers between persuasion and deception. Few people 
intentionally decide to mislead, which is a much clearer moral issue, but decisions on 
content are often made based on immediate concerns of effectiveness and expediency; 
the issue of unintentional deception is overlooked, ignored, or rationalized as within 
acceptable tolerances.47 
  
 
inc.com/en/us/accept-payments/in-person/paypal-discover [https://perma.cc/NV4X-2XZ3] (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2017). 
 44.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, For Advertisers, Algorithms Can Lead to 
Unexpected Exposure on Sites Spewing Hate, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/business/technology/for-advertisers-algorithms-can-lead-to-unexpected-exposure-on-sites-spewing 
-hate/2017/03/24/046ac164-043d-11e7-b1e9-a05d3c21f7cf_story.html?wpisrc=nl_mostdraw16&wpmm=1 
[https://perma.cc/QE97-AL54] (reporting that “[a]lgorithms decide where to place ads, based on people’s 
prior Web usage, across vastly different types of sites” and that as a result “ads for Allstate, IBM, 
DirectTV and dozens of other household brand names [have appeared] on websites with content 
containing racial and ethnic slurs, Holocaust denial and disparaging comments about African Americans, 
Jews, women and gay people”). 
 45.  Long-Ji Lin, How Machine Learning Drives Better Ad Performance, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 5, 
2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-machine-learning-drives-ad-performance-2014-2. 
 46.  Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 56 COMMUNICATIONS ASS’N 
COMPUTING MACHINERY 44, 48–49 (2013). 
 47.  Bryan Dwyer, Categorizing Unintentional Deception, [INSERT MARKETING HERE] (Sept. 23, 
2012), https://insertmarketinghere.wordpress.com/2012/09/23/categorizing-unintentional-deception/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/JCL8-TBLY]. 
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If a firm’s marketing algorithm is optimized only for profit, then where unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive acts and practices are profitable and no human intervenes, 
fraud is the predictable, if not inevitable, result. 
Experimentation in today’s data-rich environment enables personalization 
never before possible outside of expensive, in-person interactions. Advertising 
can be tailored at the individual or near-individual level, hyper-segmented by 
precisely-estimated demographics, psychological and behavioral profiles, and 
known needs. Television ads and billboards once fashioned for all viewers 
expected to see them can now vary with the specific identity of the person who is 
watching or just walking by.48 Prices once set in gross or, for financial products 
like mortgages and insurance, adjusted for the risk to the firm, can now be 
“optimized” (from the seller’s point of view) by the estimated elasticity of 
demand of each potential customer.49 In one analysis, price discrimination based 
on the crude demographic segmentation possible in the twentieth century 
increased firm profits by only about 0.3%; twenty-first-century price 
personalization based on individual web-browsing data boosted profits by 
14.55% overall, with some individual consumers paying prices more than twice 
what others paid for the same product.50 
While by no means there yet,51 twenty-first century marketing is moving 
toward targeting right down to the individual consumer in real time. Big data and 
algorithmic analytics allow firms to target the individual by channel, time of day, 
week, or year, geolocation, and activity.52 Department stores, for example, can 
track cellphone locations to know whether the consumer is in the men’s shoes 
department or in housewares and can use facial analytics software to assess 
consumer mood.53 Advertising content in online gaming can even vary based on 
whether the player is winning or losing the game.54 Truly, any data point that can 
 
 48.  See Danny Bradbury, Yahoo Wants to Spy On You Through Advertising Billboards, NAKED 
SECURITY (Oct. 11, 2011), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/10/11/yahoo-wants-to-spy-on-you-
through-advertising-billboards/ [https://perma.cc/4BNS-ARQ8]; Gerry Smith, TV Ads Are About to Get 
Personal With New Targeting Tools, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/articles/2015-09-29/tv-ads-are-about-to-get-personal-with-new-targeting-tools [https://pe 
rma.cc/CPQ2-3JWE]. 
 49.  E.g., Predict Demand, EARNIX, http://earnix.com/why-earnix/predict-demand/ [https://perma 
.cc/ESM6-AAZW] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (“With the ability to analyze and predict demand as the 
foundation, Earnix enables insurers and banks to optimize products and prices at every touch point with 
new and existing customers.”). 
 50.  Benjamin Reed Shiller, Personalized Price Discrimination Using Big Data, 108 BRANDEIS 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 1, 1 (2016), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/departments/economics/ 
RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_WP108.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQD2-R3MM]. 
 51.  See Morgan, supra note 17 (describing inaccuracies in personalized marketing). 
 52.  See Judy Lee, Personalized, Real-Time Ads Are Now a Reality, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/teradata/2015/11/04/personalized-real-time-ads-are-now-a-reality/#c55df57 
11fbf [https://perma.cc/VV9D-ZDNW]; Taplinger, supra note 27. 
 53.  See Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is Tracking Your Cell, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attention-shopper-stores-are-
tracking-your-cell.html?smid=pl-share [https://perma.cc/BTN6-LLQ6]. 
 54.  See Martin Williamson Smith et al., In-Game Advertising Influencing Factors: A Systematic 
Literature Review and Meta-Analysis, 3 COMPUTER GAMES J.: STUDENT ED. 102, 102–04 (2014). 
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be collected can be used to tailor interactions and influence consumer actions, 
both in ways that increase consumer welfare and in ways that do not. 
The cutting edge today is data-driven, personalized, real-time marketing 
deployed alongside mood manipulation to not merely catch consumers at the 
moments when they happen to be most receptive or vulnerable, but to put them 
in mood states that create this receptivity or vulnerability. Thus, the computer 
can now achieve what the very best one-on-one human influencers can. For 
example, marketers might rig a video game to dictate whether the player wins or 
loses, whichever is most useful for the marketer. One former Facebook data 
scientist explains: 
“The fundamental purpose of most people at Facebook working on data is to influence 
and alter people’s moods and behaviour. They are doing it all the time to make you like 
stories more, to click on more ads, to spend more time on the site. This is just how a 
website works . . . .”55 
While some information that can be used to increase the effectiveness of fair 
or fraudulent sales is more seamlessly observed by a human—for example, a 
consumer’s body language or the identity of a physical book she is holding—more 
and more can be observed through software and sensors. The eBook a consumer 
is reading and the pace at which she is reading it are collectable data points.56 
Moreover, algorithms are in many cases superior to human judgment—even the 
expert judgment of a seasoned salesperson—in their estimations and behavioral 
predictions.57 Further, people often respond to machines in the same way they 
respond to humans, such that machines can invoke feelings, moods, and social 
norms just as human influencers do.58 Machines might have an advantage if 
consumers do not put up defenses they normally use when dealing with a human 
they know is trying to influence them. 
As with all tools of influence, twenty-first-century tools can be used for both 
fair marketing and fraud. For example, website and app content and format can 
be optimized to highlight or obscure legally-required disclosures; to facilitate 
transactions for consumers or foist transactions on them; and to clear or obstruct 
the path to closing an account. Personalization and targeting can help consumers 
meet their needs and preferences, alerting a consumer when mortgage rates have 
dropped sufficiently to make refinancing her mortgage worthwhile, for example. 
But personalization and targeting can also be unfair, deceptive, and abusive. 
 
 55.  Kashmir Hill, Ex-Facebook Data Scientist: Every Facebook User Is Part Of An Experiment At 
Some Point, FORBES (July 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/07/ex-facebook-
data-scientist-every-facebook-user-is-part-of-an-experiment-at-some-point/#219ce34f6e0b [https://perm 
a.cc/CH7E-5FQG] (quoting former Facebook data scientist Andrew Ledvina). 
 56.  Alexandra Alter, Your E-Book Is Reading You, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/SB10001424052702304870304577490950051438304. 
 57.  See James Max Kanter & Kalyan Veeramachaneni, Deep Feature Synthesis: Towards 
Automating Data Science Endeavors, IEEE (2015), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp 
.jsp?arnumber=7344858 [https://perma.cc/S6S9-D2ZB]. 
 58.  E.g., Liz C. Wang et al., Can a Retail Web Site Be Social?, 71 J. MKTG. 143, 154 (2007) (“We 
were able to show that some of the expected responses to customer–employee interactions found in 
bricks-and-mortar stores can be induced by using social cues on Web sites as well.”). 
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Pricing can be tailored to exploit the likelihood that the consumer will fail to 
price-shop.59 Firms can identify and take advantage of consumer susceptibility to 
fraud.60 Even inebriation can be detected based on online behavior.61 Inebriated 
consumers make excellent prospects for sales of certain types of products62 and 
presumably for certain types of fraud as well. Moreover, targeting can help firms 
selectively avoid marketing to the few consumers who, if defrauded, would likely 
pursue a fraud complaint against the firm.63 
In sum, firms in the twenty-first century increasingly can achieve the 
influential power of twentieth-century one-on-one salespeople—real-time 
personalization and mood manipulation—for the price of twentieth-century mass 
marketing. Big data, automated analysis, and the virtual environment facilitate 
continual experimentation and adjustments that increase the likelihood that 
consumers will respond in ways that profit firms well beyond what twentieth-
century sales techniques could achieve. Moreover, the velocity of change, 
ephemeral nature of electronic interactions, and substitution of machine learning 
for human deliberation can render today’s unfair, deceptive, and abusive 
practices as difficult to pinpoint and prove as in-person fraud. Finally, firms have 
adopted processes by which performance data on the effectiveness of attempts to 
influence consumers drives the continuous evolution of fair and fraudulent 
consumer interactions. 
 
 59.  E.g., Tracy Samilton, Being a Loyal Auto Insurance Customer Can Cost You, NPR (May 8, 
2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/08/403598235/being-a-loyal-auto-insurance-customer-can-cost-you 
[https://perma.cc/7PLR-AV9F] (reporting that insurance companies often base decisions to increase 
premiums on an algorithm that determines which customers are least sensitive to price increases); Predict 
Demand, supra note 49. 
 60.  Cf. APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, FINANCIAL FRAUD AND FRAUD 
SUSCEPTIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: RESEARCH REPORT—PREPARED FOR THE FINRA 
INVESTOR EDUCATION FOUNDATION 3 (2013), available at https://www.saveandinvest.org/sites/default/ 
files/Financial-Fraud-And-Fraud-Susceptibility-In-The-United-States.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W7K-AJJ 
V] (identifying demographic and personality factors that correlate with susceptibility to fraud). 
 61.  L. Giancardo et al., Psychomotor Impairment Detection via Finger Interactions with a Computer 
Keyboard During Natural Typing, 5 SCI. REP. 1, 2 (2015); Machine-Learning Algorithm Identifies Tweets 
Sent Under the Influence of Alcohol, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.tech 
nologyreview.com/s/601051/machine-learning-algorithm-identifies-tweets-sent-under-the-influence-of-
alcohol/ [https://perma.cc/8RQE-QAUL]. 
 62.  Stephanie Clifford, Online Merchants Home In On Imbibing Consumers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/business/online-retailers-home-in-on-a-new-demographic-
the-drunken-consumer.html?smid=pl-share. 
 63.  See APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING, supra note 60, at 3–4 (finding most respondents who 
appear to have been victims of fraud did not identify themselves as having been defrauded and even 
those who self-identified as fraud victims usually did not pursue any complaint against the fraudster); 
Devesh Raval, What Determines Consumer Complaining Behavior? 19–25 (July 2016), https://www.ftc. 
gov/system/files/documents/public_events/966823/raval_whatdeterminesconsumercomplainingbehavior
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8DB-GKPJ] (comparing demographics of victims who raised complaints about 
particular fraudsters and demographics of victims who did not complain but were identified by law 
enforcement through those same fraudsters’ records, and finding that victims living in zip codes with 
higher proportions of African-Americans or Hispanics or in zip codes with lower proportions of people 
with college degrees were much less likely to complain about fraud than victims living in predominantly 
white or more-heavily college-educated zip codes). 
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III 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY REMEDIES 
When firms are found to have engaged in deceptive, unfair, and abusive 
practices, there are a variety of remedies that have traditionally been imposed, 
including: criminal prosecution or banning the defendant or its principals from 
the business; money damages to redress consumer injury (or disgorgement of 
defendants’ ill-gotten gains); direct financial sanctions such as fines and 
reputational sanctions with indirect financial effects; information injunctions 
(misrepresentation prohibitions or disclosure requirements); and practices 
injunctions. More recently, independent third-party audits have been introduced 
as remedial enforcement mechanisms to support information and practices 
injunctions. 
In theory these remedies can redress past consumer injury, halt further injury, 
and deter firms from committing future violations. But as investors know, 
twentieth-century remedies alone usually impose little cost on defendant firms; 
on average, stock market returns barely budge when enforcement agencies 
announce that they are pursuing a firm for deceptive advertising.64 In practice, 
twentieth-century remedies routinely fail to fully compensate consumer victims, 
do not incapacitate firms from continuing to harm consumers, and produce 
insufficient specific or general deterrence. 
A. The Nuclear Options 
Enforcement agencies have a pair of extremely powerful remedies for dealing 
with unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices—enforcers can criminally prosecute 
fraudsters or ban them from the industry altogether. However, these nuclear 
options are rarely used unless the firms have no legitimate business purpose (such 
as fake charities65 and Ponzi schemes66) or have a business model grounded 
exclusively in illegal practices (such as debt collection firms that use abusive 
collection methods67 or so-called “debt relief services” that do not actually 
provide services68). 
 
 64.  See Michael A. Wiles et al., Stock Market Response to Regulatory Reports of Deceptive 
Advertising: The Moderating Effect of Omission Bias and Firm Reputation, 29 MKTG. SCI. 828 (2010) 
(finding average abnormal return reductions of less than 1% associated with regulatory reports of 
deceptive advertising).  
 65.  See, e.g., Former NBA Player Indicted on Charity Fraud Scheme, STOPFRAUD.GOV (May 25, 
2016), https://www.stopfraud.gov/iso/opa/stopfraud/former-nba-player-indicted-charity-fraud-scheme.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/7KCA-EYRR]. 
 66.  See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?smid=pl-share. 
 67.  See, e.g., Banned Debt Collectors, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/ 
cases-proceedings/banned-debt-collectors [https://perma.cc/T9AH-JX92] (list of cases in which the FTC 
has obtained orders banning individuals from the debt collection industry). 
 68.  See, e.g., Banned Mortgage Relief and Debt Relief Companies and People, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/banned-mortgage-relief-debt-relief-companies-peo 
ple [https://perma.cc/YL2E-SLPR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) (list of cases in which the FTC has obtained 
orders banning individuals from the mortgage and debt relief industries). 
WILLIS_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2017  9:16 PM 
No. 3 2017] PERFORMANCE-BASED REMEDIES 19 
Most defendants caught engaging in unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices 
are not even threatened with criminal prosecution or an industry ban. In the 
Hawaiian Punch deception case, the FTC undoubtedly never considered using 
these remedies against the product’s manufacturer, which at that time was RJR 
Foods, Inc. RJR Foods was a subsidiary of what was then a giant tobacco and 
food industry holding company, RJ Reynolds Industries, Inc.69 Similarly, there 
has been no hint that the CFPB referred PayPal to the Department of Justice for 
criminal prosecution after discovering that the firm was, among other things, 
charging customers’ purchases to PayPal Credit accounts when the customers 
attempted to select or even had affirmatively selected their PayPal transaction 
accounts.70 Companies of these sizes are considered too big to fail and too big to 
jail.71 The nuclear options thus have little deterrence value. 
B. Damages And Disgorgement 
In contrast to the nuclear options, damages or, where damages are difficult to 
calculate, disgorgement, are standard remedies for fraud. Enforcement agencies 
routinely tout the sticker price of the cases they resolve.72 But though recoveries 
may sound high, they systematically understate the true amount by which 
fraudsters benefit from their unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices and they do 
not account for the probability of non-detection. 
A preliminary concern with using damages as a remedy is that logistical 
hurdles prevent complete recovery. Because the government bears the burden of 
proving the amount of damages or ill-gotten gains, awards are biased 
downward.73 Further, for defendant firms that are no longer operating, there are 
rarely sufficient assets to provide complete redress, and once the firms’ principals 
have spent or hidden the funds, complete recoupment is rare.74 Thus, the amounts 
 
 69.  RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.funding 
universe.com/company-histories/r-j-reynolds-tobacco-holdings-inc-history/ [https://perma.cc/2AF7-ZF 
S5] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
 70.  PayPal Complaint, supra note 41, at ¶ 29. 
 71.  See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE 
WITH CORPORATIONS (2014). 
 72.  The CFPB website’s homepage, for example, announces: “Standing up for you—We hold 
companies accountable for illegal practices—$11.8 billion in relief to consumers from our enforcement 
actions.” CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/?gclid=CKfLhNXN79 
ICFQuifgodWw0C4Q [https://perma.cc/MB3X-N99S] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (emphasis in original). 
 73.  Under the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to damages in unfair, deceptive, 
or abusive practices litigation, when the evidence is in equipoise as to any part of damages, the factfinder 
must find against the enforcement agency. 
 74.  See, e.g., Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Settlement of Claims, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n. v. Asset & Capital Mgmt. Grp., No. 8:13-cv-01107-DSF-JC, 13–24 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2014) 
(imposing judgment of over $89 million based on damages to consumer victims and then suspending all 
but $4 million of that judgment—presumably the amount of assets that the FTC believed it could actually 
recover); Michael Rothfeld & Brad Reagan, Prosecutors Are Still Chasing Billions in Uncollected Debts, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutors-are-still-chasing-97-billion-in-
uncollected-debts-1410984264 (reporting on the billions of dollars in judgment debts that have not been 
collected by the government, much of which stems from restitution ordered in fraud cases). 
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collected are routinely lower than the amount by which the defendant firm 
benefitted. 
A more fundamental problem is that compensatory damages and 
disgorgement are by their very nature ineffective at remedying and stopping 
fraud. Damages and disgorgement figures are based on calculations 
approximately as of the date of the remedial order, but the effects of the firm’s 
practices often linger. False beliefs instilled by deceptive advertising persist, 
likely motivating consumers to buy the product even after the defendant’s 
misrepresentations cease. For example, one study found that six months after 
pharmaceutical firm Novartis Corporation ceased falsely advertising that its 
product, Doan’s back reliever, was better than other pain relievers for back pain, 
77% of Doan’s users and 45% of consumers who did not use Doan’s but were 
aware of the brand continued to be so misled.75 Nearly a decade after the 
remedial order enjoining further misleading advertising in the Hawaiian Punch 
case, about 33% of Hawaiian Punch purchasers continued to inaccurately believe 
that the drink contained more than 20% fruit juice.76 
Moreover, given that the probability of detection and pursuit is nowhere near 
100%, even full damages or complete disgorgement cannot effectively deter 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. The FTC estimates that over 10% of the 
adult population in the United States—over 25 million people—are victimized by 
fraud every year.77 But the most comprehensive reporting of consumer fraud 
complaints to federal and state authorities and private organizations tallied only 
1.8 million complaints in 2011.78 Few of these complaints result in enforcement 
actions. For example, the FTC’s Consumer Protection Bureau, which runs the 
consumer complaint system that received those 1.8 million complaints in 2011, 
brought a grand total of 83 administrative, federal court, and civil penalty cases 
between March 16, 2011 and February 29, 2012.79 Recent revelations that 
enforcement agencies failed to take action against Wells Fargo Bank until over 
5,000 employees over the course of more than five years had opened 1.5 million 
unauthorized accounts is a reminder of the low probability of civil prosecution of  
 
 
 
 
 75.  See Novartis Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 223 F.3d 783, 788 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (referencing 
study). 
 76.  Kinnear et al., supra note 12, at 42, Fig. 1. 
 77.  Keith B. Anderson, Consumer Fraud in the United States, 2011: The Third FTC Survey, BUREAU 
OF ECON. FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (2013). 
 78.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY–
DECEMBER 2011 2 (2012), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january/sentinel-cy2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV2V-ECGY]. 
 79.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANNUAL HIGHLIGHTS 2011: STATS & 
DATA, available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annual-report-standard/ftc-2012/stats-data [https://perma 
.cc/WGY6-TBYU] (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). Although these cases sought remedies for many more than 
83 victims, including many victims who never complained, the cases did not seek remedies for anywhere 
near all 25 million victims. 
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even widespread, long-term, systematic fraud.80 If damages and disgorgement are 
the only remedies, it is profitable for firms to violate the law. 
C. Financial And Reputational Sanctions 
Deterrence is a function of both the size of the penalty and the probability 
that the penalty will be imposed. In theory, therefore, large financial sanctions 
could deter fraud, despite the low probability of detection and successful 
prosecution. But sanctions imposed today are rarely large enough to deter.81 
Moreover, even “large” sanctions are ineffectual if they are uncollectable. 
Civil penalties may seem high to the average consumer, but firms in the 
twenty-first century, particularly multinationals and financial firms, are often so 
large and profitable that the penalties are but a minute cost of doing business. 
For example, the CFPB’s 2015 settlement with PayPal required the firm to pay 
$10 million in civil penalties.82 This figure sounds large compared to, for example, 
the 2015 U.S. household median gross income of $54,000.83 However, it was less 
than .003% of PayPal’s 2015 gross income of $3.82 billion.84 
Drastically-insufficient enforcement resources drive enforcement agency 
unwillingness to demand larger fines. An agency that refused to settle would have 
to abandon the case or go to trial. The expense of trial would leave too few 
resources for the agency to pursue many other meritorious cases,85 creating a 
politically unpalatable lottery effect. Trial also poses a risk to the agency of a 
humiliating courtroom loss. 
Agencies therefore generally choose to file more cases and settle them 
cheaply rather than demanding larger fines. Once the agency has negotiated a 
fine that sounds large in absolute terms, thus satisfying the agency’s public 
relations needs,86 the agency is better off using its next dollar to pursue another 
case than it would be going to trial against the prior defendant in search of a 
higher, deterrent-level fine. 
 
 80.  See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-
years-of-harm-to-customers.html. 
 81.  Cf. Fine and Punishment: The Economics of Crime Suggests That Corporate Fines Should Be 
Even Higher, THE ECONOMIST (July 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21559315 [https://perm 
a.cc/G475-V2LE]. 
 82.  Stipulated Final Judgment and Order, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. PayPal, No. 1:15-cv-01426, 
2015 WL 3995264, at *¶ 29 (D. Md. May 21, 2015), [hereinafter PayPal Order]. 
 83.  US Household Income, DEP’T NUMBERS, http://www.deptofnumbers.com/income/us/ [https:// 
perma.cc/FT5S-AM84]. 
 84.  PayPal Holdings Inc., MARKETWATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/pypl/fin 
ancials [https://perma.cc/M2F7-BH54]. 
 85.  See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Offers Regrets, But Doesn’t Admit Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-apologizes-but-does 
nt-admit-misconduct.html (“It could take years of court battles for regulators to prove that every one of 
the 1.5 million accounts that Wells said may have been unauthorized was indeed phony.”). 
 86.  See id. (“Some Congressional officials and governmental watchdog groups say regulators may 
be too eager to extract a headline-grabbing fine and to settle a case quickly [rather] than to prove a bank’s 
guilt in court.”).  
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Reputational sanctions can be effective, but frequently are not.87 Sometimes 
consumers cannot vote with their feet; if a loan servicer is engaging in unfair 
practices in collecting loan payments, a consumer might refinance with another 
lender, but the new lender might employ the very same servicer to collect the new 
loan payments.88 Even when consumers can boycott a firm, they face a collective-
action problem in doing so. Further, many consumers, due to over-optimism and 
the illusion of control, do not fear being defrauded themselves.89 They may hear 
that a defendant firm’s advertising was found misleading but believe that they 
were unaffected.90 If they do realize they have been defrauded, they often blame 
themselves and are too embarrassed to tell their friends and neighbors about the 
episode.91 As previously noted, few victims file complaints. 
The aftermath of the PayPal case provides an example suggestive of little or 
no reputational sanctions. The case and resulting consent decree were widely 
reported in the news in May 2015.92 Nonetheless, the defendant’s net payment 
volume, number of transactions, and total customer base all increased steadily 
every quarter in 2015,93 and in 2016 the defendant announced that its business 
had been growing at a greater rate than the payment products market as a 
whole.94 One cannot be sure without a control, but these numbers suggest no 
adverse consumer response to the news of PayPal’s alleged unfair, deceptive, and 
abusive practices. PayPal’s credit product payment volume grew at an especially 
 
 87.  Cf. Judith van Erp, Reputational Sanctions in Private and Public Regulation, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 
146, 157–60 (2008) (explaining why reputational sanctions are unlikely to be effective in the public 
regulation sphere). 
 88.  See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PUTTING THE “SERVICE” BACK IN MORTGAGE 
SERVICING available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201208_cfpb_mortgage_servicing_fact_sheet 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/T28B-QGSE] (“In the vast majority of cases, consumers do not choose their 
mortgage servicer. Because the lender employs the servicer, not the consumer, servicers have had little 
incentive to meet consumer needs.”). 
 89.  See generally MARIA KONNIKOVA, THE CONFIDENCE GAME: WHY WE FALL FOR IT . . . 
EVERY TIME (2016). 
 90.  See James T. Tiedge et al., Discrepancy Between Perceived First-Person and Perceived Third-
Person Mass Media Effects, 68 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 141, 141–42 (1991).  
 91.  See Linda Ganzini et al., Victims of Fraud: Comparing Victims of White Collar and Violent 
Crime, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 55, 56 (1990). 
 92.  See, e.g., Feds Accuse PayPal of Engaging in Deceptive Advertising, NBC NEWS (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/feds-accuse-paypal-engaging-deceptive-advertising-n36137 
6 [https://perma.cc/9ZMU-DAR7]; Jonnelle Marte, CFPB Seeks to Fine PayPal $25 Million Over Credit 
Allegations, WASH. POST (May 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2015/05/ 
19/agency-wants-to-fine-paypal-25-million-to-settle-credit-allegations/?utm_term=.0a822a314ff7 [https: 
//perma.cc/4FG4-ZRYA]; Kevin McCoy, PayPal to Pay $25M in Refunds and Penalties, USA TODAY 
(May 19, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/05/19/pay-pal-cfpb-penalties/27579087/ 
[https://perma.cc/2CWY-XN6A]; Alain Sherter, Feds Say PayPal Illegally Signed Consumers Up For 
Credit, CBS NEWS (May 19, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/feds-say-paypal-illegally-signed-
consumers-up-for-credit/ [https://perma.cc/Z2AN-4DJN]. 
 93.  PayPal Q4-15 and Full Year 2015 Investor Update, PAYPAL (2016), http://files.shareholder.com/ 
downloads/AMDA-4BS3R8/0x0x871870/9563A23D-53A8-4641-BC7A-C495B16E715C/Q4_15_Investo 
r_Update.pdf. 
 94.  Berkeley Lovelace Jr., PayPal Payments Business is Growing Faster than the Market as a Whole, 
CFO said, CNBC (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/21/paypal-payments-business-is-grow 
ing-faster-than-the-market-as-a-whole-cfo-said.html. 
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fast rate every quarter in 2015, even though—or, more ominously, because—it 
was the very product that, as news reports explained, the defendant had been 
tricking consumers into using.95 
Moreover, while enforcement agencies issue press releases to ensure that the 
public knows the agencies are putting taxpayer dollars to good use, defendants 
can allocate much more substantial resources to build counter-narratives. For 
example, after the FTC order requiring Hawaiian Punch packaging and 
advertising to disclose the product’s limited fruit juice content, its manufacturer, 
RJR Foods, took steps to ensure that consumers would continue to perceive the 
product as healthy. The firm added to the product’s label, in larger and more eye-
catching print than the 10% fruit juice content statement, a proclamation that the 
juice contained 100% of the recommended daily allowance for Vitamin C.96 A 
few years later, the firm hired pop singers Donny and Marie Osmond, cultural 
symbols of wholesomeness at that time, as Hawaiian Punch spokespeople.97 
In the twenty-first century, firms can move more quickly to counter any 
reputational effects of enforcement actions. PayPal, as it was settling the CFPB’s 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices allegations, pushed a campaign in which 
it branded itself a “Customer Champion Company.”98 Its website today touts that 
“the highest ethical standards” and doing “what’s right” are “the guiding light for 
how we operate.”99 
Reputational sanctions are thus rarely sufficient to deter unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive practices. Until enforcement agencies have the resources to demand 
sufficiently large financial penalties or to dramatically increase the number of 
cases they pursue, other remedies are necessary. 
D. Information Injunctions 
Information injunctions—prohibiting defendants from making specific 
misrepresentations or requiring defendants to make specific disclosures, 
 
 95.  See Leena Rao, This Is One of PayPal’s Fastest Growing Businesses, FORTUNE (Dec. 24, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/12/24/paypal-credit-growth/ [https://perma.cc/A9HK-75NV]. 
 96.  Compare Hawaiian Punch Label 1969–1970, https://www.flickr.com/photos/wafflewhiffer/ 
8933344964 (last visited Feb. 7, 2017), with Hawaiian Punch Label 1970s after the FTC Order, 
http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3565/3332188514_e0fd5c6411.jpg (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). Note that the 
product today contains 5% juice. Hawaiian Punch Product Info, HAWAIIAN PUNCH.COM, http://www. 
hawaiianpunch.com/productinfo.php [https://perma.cc/7ACZ-XPY2] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 97.  Norm Clarke, Bodacious Moved For Decency’s Sake, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Mar. 16, 2008), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/norm-clarke/bodacious-moved-decencys-sake [https://perma.cc/Q2NB-
E8V9] (describing the pair as “paragons of wholesomeness”); History, HAWAIIAN PUNCH, 
http://www.hawaiianpunch.com/history.php [https://perma.cc/H78J-S88E] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017); see 
also Donny and Marie Osmond Biography, ENCYCLOPEDIA WORLD BIOGRAPHY, http://www.notable 
biographies.com/supp/Supplement-Mi-So/Osmond-Donny-and-Marie.html [https://perma.cc/LZP2-WG 
W2] (noting the pair’s “distinctively wholesome public images”). 
 98.  ANALYST DAY 2016, PAYPAL 6 (2016), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-
4BS3R8/3922159541x0x892591/1A709918-00B0-4440-ADDF-CCEB083CE80E/PayPal_AnalystDay_20 
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V7B-3X2Y]. 
 99. Responsible Practices, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/about/responsible-
practices [https://perma.cc/W28C-VBQN] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
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disclaimers, or corrective statements—are another twentieth-century remedy 
ordered in cases of unfairness, deception, and abuse. For example, the 
aforementioned order in the Hawaiian Punch case required the manufacturer to 
add a disclosure of the product’s actual fruit juice content to the product’s 
advertising and labels.100 Along the same lines, in the PayPal case the defendant 
was ordered to, “[c]learly and prominently disclose, through a method, such as a 
pop-up box, that PayPal Credit is a line of credit and may be subject to interest 
and that consumers will receive their billing statements electronically at the email 
address designated by the consumer.”101 
In some cases, defendants have been required to engage in corrective 
advertising campaigns, disseminating statements that are intended to correct 
prior misrepresentations. For example, in the Doan’s back reliever case, the FTC 
ordered Novartis Corporation, as a remedy for deception, to add a corrective 
statement to its product’s packaging and written advertising stating: “Although 
Doan’s is an effective pain reliever, there is no evidence that Doan’s is more 
effective than other pain relievers for back pain.”102 
Mounting evidence indicates that these information injunctions are 
ineffective.103 Nearly a decade after the FTC ordered that a statement about 
Hawaiian Punch’s 10% fruit juice content be added to the product’s label, about 
33% of Hawaiian Punch purchasers still believed that the drink contained more 
than 20% juice.104 The proportion of purchasers who continued to be deceived 
about the product was slightly higher than the proportion of non-purchasers who 
continued to be deceived, even though the purchasers by definition had in their 
possession Hawaiian punch cans with labels disclosing “Contains 10% fruit 
juice.”105 Corrective advertising can even backfire, reinforcing the original false 
message, if not done well.106 
The problem is not that enforcement agencies have not found the perfect 
disclosure; it is that information injunctions are inevitably weak as compared to 
the marketing they are up against. The disclosures mandated by these orders are 
uniform for all consumers, even though marketers know that different 
consumers—and a single consumer at different moments in time—are best 
reached in different ways.107 The prescribed messages are static, rather than 
 
 100.  See In the Matter of RJR Foods, Inc., et al., 83 F.T.C. 7, *4–*5 (1973). 
 101.  PayPal Order, supra note 82, at *¶ 17A. 
 102.  Novartis Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 223 F.3d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding FTC 
order). 
 103.  See, e.g., G.V. Johar & C.J. Simmons, The Use of Concurrent Disclosures to Correct Invalid 
Inferences, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 307 (2000); Fred W. Morgan & Jeffrey J. Stoltman, Television 
Advertising Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment, 16 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 515 (2002).  
 104.  Kinnear et al., supra note 12, at 42, Fig. 1. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See, e.g., Ian Skurnik et al., How Warnings About False Claims Become Recommendations, 31 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 713 (2005). 
 107.  On occasion, the orders have required lightly personalized disclosures that reflect information 
specific to a consumer, such as the financial effect of borrowing money to attend a for-profit educational 
institution or the graduation rates for the particular field of study the student intends to pursue. See 
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updated to respond to changing context, background social knowledge, or 
consumer habituation. Information injunction provisions are based on 
predictions about how consumers will react, but marketers do not develop a 
campaign, launch it, and stay the course.108 In the twenty-first century, they use 
iterative testing to continually adapt the message to best reach each consumer. 
Just as testing is crucial for marketing because it is not obvious what will and 
will not affect consumers, so too testing is crucial for disclosures. The FTC knows 
this well. Several years ago, the Commission hired consumer survey experts to 
experiment with three different advertisements for windows, with copy stating:  
i.  “PROVEN TO SAVE 47% ON YOUR HEATING AND COOLING 
BILLS!”; 
ii.  “PROVEN TO SAVE UP TO 47% ON YOUR HEATING AND 
COOLING BILLS!” ; and  
iii.  “PROVEN TO SAVE UP TO 47%* ON YOUR HEATING AND 
COOLING BILLS!” followed by a disclaimer in readily readable font, 
emphasized by a surrounding box, stating: “*The average [windows 
brand] owner saves about 25% on heating and cooling bills.”  
The first ad was false and the second two were true. But subjects reading the 
second, “up to” ad were just as likely to believe they would save 47% on their 
bills as subjects viewing the first ad, and the third ad’s additional “clear and 
conspicuous” disclaimer did not significantly reduce this confusion.109 
These results were obtained in lab testing, where subjects have nothing to do 
but examine the advertisements. In the distracting environment of the real world, 
consumer confusion would likely be higher still. The FTC will not disclose 
whether it has performed any consumer surveys to evaluate the effects of the 
corrective advertising orders it has entered against defendants.110 The most 
natural explanation for such secrecy is that the Commission has engaged in such 
testing and found that information injunctions did not dispel consumer confusion. 
In an attempt to increase the effectiveness of disclosures that defendants are 
ordered to make, enforcement officials have attempted to micromanage the 
disclosures’ text, placement, font, size, color, and delivery volume and speed.111 
 
Consent Decree at ¶¶ 17 & 71, State of Washington v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., No. IE-2-27G23-9 SEA (King 
Cty. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Educ. Mgmt. Corp. Consent Decree].  
 108.  See Nichols, supra note 2, at 9 (“Gone are the days of setting a marketing plan and letting it run 
its course—the so-called run-and-done approach.”). 
 109.  MANOJ HASTAK & DENNIS MURPHY, EFFECTS OF A BRISTOL WINDOWS ADVERTISEMENT 
WITH AN “UP TO” SAVINGS CLAIM ON CONSUMER TAKE-AWAY AND BELIEFS (2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/effects-bristol-windows-advertisement-savings-
claim-consumer-take-away-beliefs/12 0629bristolwindowsreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU2P-67SA].  
 110.  Telephone interview with Michael Ostheimer, Deputy, Division of Advertising Practices, 
Consumer Protection Bureau, FTC (July 7, 2016). I asked Mr. Ostheimer whether the FTC’s own testing 
had found that the corrective statements it had ordered firms to employ were effective or ineffective. He 
would not confirm whether the FTC had even performed such testing.  
 111.  E.g., Decision and Order, In the Matter of Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576, *2–*4 (F.T.C. May 
20, 2016) (containing lengthy list of specifications for ordered disclosure). 
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But an information injunction can never control the full context in which the 
consumer perceives and interprets a disclosure. A defendant could easily comply 
with the letter of an injunction ordering a disclosure found effective in the lab, 
and then nullify the disclosure’s effects with delays, distractions, time pressure, 
or any number of other ploys. 
One study found a disclosure that, in experimental conditions, was truly 
effective—it changed subjects’ immediately subsequent actions. But when just a 
fifteen-second delay was added between the disclosure and the loading of the 
next webpage, the effect of the disclosure was eliminated entirely.112 Drug 
makers, which are required to list side effects in their television and radio 
advertising for prescription medications, have perfected strategies—for example, 
boring or soothing voice tones—to ensure that consumers do not absorb the 
information.113 Each context is different, but, through experimentation, a 
defendant can determine which tactics most effectively undermine any particular 
information injunction. 
Even if it were possible to specify every aspect of a remedial disclosure such 
that defendants could not outfox the injunction, micromanagement of this sort is 
an inefficient way to eliminate customer confusion. Monitoring costs are likely to 
be high, requiring enforcement agencies to check details down to font size and 
delivery speed. More importantly, left to their own devices, defendant firms could 
almost certainly find less expensive ways to achieve whatever level of consumer 
understanding that these enforcement-agency-designed disclosures obtain. 
In sum, information injunctions do not correct consumer confusion induced 
by unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. Moreover, even if this remedy were 
effective, it is unlikely that it would be the most efficient way to correct consumer 
confusion. 
E. Practices Injunctions 
Practices injunctions are a standard remedy imposed in cases of unfairness, 
deception, or abuse. Although enforcement agencies and courts are permitted to 
order prophylactic measures “to close all roads to the prohibited goal,”114 
practices injunctions typically only erect a few posts to maneuver around. 
Defendants are not seriously fenced in by these remedies. 
  
 
 112.  ldris Adjerid et al., Sleights of Privacy: Framing, Disclosures, and the Limits of Transparency, 
SYMP. USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 1, 2 (2013). 
 113.  Megan Thielking, Drug Makers Have a Sneaky Way of Describing Side Effects in TV Ads, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-drug-ads-describe-side-effects-2016-2 
[https://perma.cc/BP9U-GWGB]. 
 114.  Litton Indus., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 676 F.2d 364, 370 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Fencing-in 
provisions serve to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that [the FTC’s] order may not be by-passed 
with impunity.”); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965) (“The 
Commission is not limited to prohibiting the illegal practice in the precise form in which it is found to 
have existed in the past. Having been caught violating the [FTC] Act, respondents must expect some 
fencing in.”). 
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Practices injunctions commonly prohibit the precise unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts the firm was caught doing. For example, the PayPal decree 
prohibited the defendant from processing a consumer’s payment through PayPal 
Credit if she chose another payment option115 and from pre-selecting PayPal 
Credit as the default payment method unless the consumer had previously 
consented to PayPal Credit as her payment method for future transactions.116 
Practices injunctions can also affirmatively mandate that the defendant take 
specific acts designed to prevent further fraud. The PayPal decree contains 
several of these, each designed to control the process by which the defendant 
obtains consent from consumers. For example, the decree orders PayPal to 
ensure that when a consumer applies for PayPal Credit or selects PayPal Credit 
as the customer’s default method of payment, the customer affirmatively 
indicates consent through a means that is labeled to convey consent or that 
discloses that the consumer is consenting.117 
Like detailed information injunctions, detailed practices injunctions attempt 
to micromanage defendants’ interactions with consumers to prevent further 
fraud. But fraud can be achieved in many ways, particularly in the electronic 
transaction environment. For example, pre-checking a box is one method, but 
screen placement of messages and tick-boxes can lead consumers to blindly check 
the same box out of habit.118 
A failed regulatory effort to control banks’ interactions with their 
accountholders provides a cautionary tale. Regulators, concerned that consumers 
were unwittingly and repeatedly incurring bank account overdraft fees, began 
requiring banks to provide specified disclosures and obtain accountholder 
consent to being enrolled in an overdraft program before charging 
accountholders overdraft fees.119 Banks then used a variety of ploys to confuse 
their accountholders into taking actions that appeared to demonstrate the 
required consumer “consent.”120 In reality, many of these consumers did not 
understand that the box they were checking would allow the bank to charge them 
overdraft fees.121 
Practices injunctions are bound to fail because the defendant will always be 
the last mover, able to comply with the injunction and then do other things that 
affect consumer perception and action. As a result, practices injunctions do not 
prevent defendants from engaging in further deception, unfairness, and abuse. 
 
 115.  PayPal Order, supra note 82, at *¶ 17B. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at *¶¶ 17A & 17B. 
 118.  Cf. Serge Egelman et al., You’ve Been Warned: An Empirical Study of the Effectiveness of Web 
Browser Phishing Warnings, INST. FOR SOFTWARE RES. (2008) (documenting that computer users 
habitually click to clear pop-up boxes, even when those boxes contain important warnings). 
 119.  See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1174–81 
(2013). 
 120.  Id. at 1185–1200. 
 121.  See id. at 1189–90. 
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F. A Turn-of-the-Century Addition: Audits In Support Of Information And 
Practices Injunctions 
Whereas at one time, enforcement officials themselves attempted (or at least 
intended) to periodically review compliance with information and practices 
injunctions, remedial orders have begun to demand that defendants hire 
independent experts to assess compliance through audits. Although the 
effectiveness of these audits is limited by the nature of the underlying injunctive 
provisions, audits are a move in the right direction. 
These types of audits are routinely ordered in discrimination, environmental, 
and institutional reform litigation. For example, defendants have been ordered 
to hire auditors to periodically perform mystery shopper testing to assess 
defendants’ compliance with practices injunctions prohibiting disability or race 
discrimination.122 In cases of environmental law violations, courts have entered 
orders requiring defendants to employ new technology to prevent further 
environmental damage and to hire an independent auditor to monitor whether 
the firm has properly installed, operated, and maintained this technology.123 In 
police department reform litigation, the use of auditing to monitor and reduce 
civil rights violations has been so effective as to be called “transformative.”124 
Similar audits are just now being employed in cases of unfairness, deception, 
or abuse. In one case where enforcement agencies charged Education 
Management Company and related entities with deceptive and abusive 
enrollment and retention practices at a chain of for-profit post-secondary schools, 
the defendants were ordered to pay a third-party auditor to review their activities 
to ensure compliance with the decree’s information and practices injunctions.125 
To facilitate the auditor’s review, defendants were required to record all 
telephone conversations between the defendants’ employees and current and 
prospective students as well as install an automated voice interaction analytics 
platform to permit remote auditing of those conversations.126 Consumer cases 
brought by private parties have similarly been resolved with audit provisions.127 
 
 122.  See, e.g., Order, Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 4692 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2005) (ordering third-party mystery shopper testing of a cross-section of defendant’s 
stores to assess compliance with injunction ordering defendant to limit the time during which obstructions 
prevent wheelchair users from accessing the aisles); Consent Order, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. 
Sav. Bank et al., No. 1:94-cv-01829-JLG, ¶ 4.3.9.5 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994) (requiring bank to hire mystery 
shoppers to engage in ongoing testing of mortgage lending officers for race discrimination). 
 123.  See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. S. Coal Co., No. 7:16-cv-00462-GEC, ¶¶ 39–41 (W.D. 
Va. Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter S. Coal Consent Decree]. 
 124.  Stephen Rushin, Competing Case Studies of Structural Reform Litigation in American Police 
Departments, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113, 128 (2016). The auditing structure in police department reform 
cases can involve internal and external auditing. For example, to remake the Los Angeles Police 
Department after the Ramparts scandal, an internal Audit Unit was tasked with performing stratified, 
randomized audits to determine whether the Department was meeting performance targets for various 
police practices. The Audit Unit’s audits were then audited by independent court-appointed monitors. 
Id. 
 125.  Educ. Mgmt. Corp. Consent Decree, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 34 & 40. 
 126.  Id. at ¶ 95. 
 127.  See, e.g., Class Action Settlement Agreement, Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 314 F.R.D. 312,  
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For example, to resolve claims of false advertising, beverage seller Naked Juice 
Company agreed to hire an independent auditor to substantiate the non-GMO 
statements on its product labels. The class action settlement required the auditor 
to test samples of the company’s raw materials and finished products and 
examine production sites and ingredient suppliers’ supply chains for three 
years.128 
If performed well, audits do two things. First, they better ensure that the 
defendant will obey the specific injunctive terms of the decree. Second, they 
internalize a substantial portion of the costs incurred due to defendant’s violation 
of the law by having the defendant, rather than the taxpayer, bear monitoring 
costs.129 Given the opacity of internal firm practices and the limited resources and 
expertise of enforcement agencies, independent third-party audits are 
essential.130 In the case against Education Management Company, the decree 
required the defendants to pay the third-party auditor up to one million dollars 
annually for three to five years.131 
Audits alone are not enough to ensure that information and practices 
injunctions eliminate consumer confusion and ill consequences wrought by 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. A defendant might pass an audit that 
examines only technical compliance with these injunctions while continuing to 
defraud consumers.132 Nonetheless, the growing use of audits in support of 
information and practices injunctions demonstrates that audits can feasibly and 
legally be ordered as part of a remedial decree. Audits recognize the principle 
that once a defendant firm has been caught defrauding consumers, that defendant 
ought to bear the burden of demonstrating compliance with the remedies ordered 
against it, rather than the government having to prove that the defendant violated 
the decree. The customer confusion and consequences audits proposed below 
rely on and extend this principle. 
 
¶ 6.1.7 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (agreeing to periodic auditing to ensure the reference prices used to advertise 
sales are accurate); Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release, Garofalo v. Recreational Equip., 
Inc., No. CIVDS 1416513 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2014) (agreeing to two years of mystery shopper testing 
to demonstrate that firm employees were no longer engaging in the alleged prohibited practices).  
 128.  Stipulation of Settlement at ¶ 50(a), Naked Juice Cases, No. 2:11-cv-08276 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 
2013) [hereinafter Naked Juice Settlement]. 
 129.  Not all monitoring costs are borne by the firm; the enforcement agency must audit the auditors 
with sufficient frequency to ensure against auditor corruption or incompetence. Cf. Audit Requirements 
for Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 16 C.F.R. § 1112 (2013) (setting forth regulations 
according to which the Consumer Product Safety Commission will audit third parties that test children’s 
products to ensure that the products comply with applicable child safety rules). 
 130.  See, e.g., Ariane Hegewisch et al., Ending Race and Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, INST. 
FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. 1, 7 (2011) (finding that external monitors are key to the effectiveness of 
consent decrees in sex and race discrimination and harassment cases). 
 131.  Educ. Mgmt. Corp. Consent Decree, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 39 & 49.  
 132.  In theory, a remedial order might broadly prohibit firms from engaging in tactics that undermine 
the effectiveness of information and practices injunctions. But to identify such tactics, an auditor would 
need to impose an expensive and intrusive bureaucratic layer upon many firm activities. This layer would 
interfere with and slow down both fraud and fair sales. 
WILLIS_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2017  9:16 PM 
30 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80:7 
IV 
PERFORMANCE-BASED REMEDIES: ORDERING FIRMS TO ERADICATE THEIR 
OWN FRAUD 
To meet the challenge of twenty-first-century fraud, courts and enforcement 
agencies must adopt the same performance-based approaches firms now use to 
hone fair sales and fraud. Two are advocated here: confusion injunctions and 
consequences injunctions. Confusion injunctions prohibit firms that have 
unfairly, deceptively, or abusively exploited customer confusion from continuing 
to do so. Consequences injunctions prohibit firms from continuing to unfairly, 
deceptively, or abusively inflict ill consequences on their customers. 
Defendants must demonstrate compliance with confusion and consequences 
injunctions through customer audits—random sample testing by independent 
third-party experts hired by the defendant firm to determine whether the firm’s 
customers remain deceived about their transactions with the firm or are still 
suffering ill consequences from the firm’s practices. Defendants must 
substantially eradicate the customer confusion and ill consequences wrought by 
their fraud or face penalties for violating a court order. 
After describing past experience with performance-based remedies, the 
following explains the mechanics of implementation of these remedies and the 
reasons they are likely to be more effective than twentieth-century remedies in 
the fight against twenty-first-century fraud. 
A. Past Uses Of Performance-Based Remedies 
Performance-based remedies were developed to address cases where courts 
or enforcement agencies discovered that practices injunctions were futile. For 
example, after Brown v. Board of Education in the mid-1950s, courts and 
enforcement agencies attempted in vain to use practices injunctions to achieve 
desegregation of segregated school systems.133 When these failed, courts and 
agencies turned to ordering defendants to meet specified racial-integration 
benchmarks, upheld as an equitable remedy for prior race discrimination in 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.134 Injunctions giving 
defendants both the responsibility to meet measurable benchmarks and the 
flexibility to determine how to reach these benchmarks continue to be imposed 
as remedies for discrimination today.135 
In 2011, in Brown v. Plata, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the propriety 
of performance-based remedial orders.136 The Court upheld a district court order 
 
 133.  See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955–
1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485 (1978). 
 134.  402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 135.  See, e.g., Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal, United States v. Westchester, No. 
06-2860, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009) (ordering the defendant county to “within seven (7) years of the 
entry of this Stipulation and Order, ensure the development of at least seven hundred fifty (750) new 
affordable housing units”). 
 136.  563 U.S. 493, 541–45 (2011). 
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giving California two years to lower its inmate population density to 137.5% of 
prison design capacity.137 The order did not specify how the defendant was to 
reach this benchmark. Instead, the State of California was given the freedom and 
the responsibility for determining the best way, given its particular circumstances, 
to do so.138 
Performance-based remedies were birthed from the challenge of recalcitrant 
defendants in civil and constitutional rights cases, but have since been extended 
to other contexts. Cases involving violations of environmental laws are often 
resolved through the use of performance injunctions, coupled with audits 
monitoring whether defendants have complied with the injunctions’ benchmarks 
for emissions.139 The benefit of performance-based remedies for environmental 
cases is that they give defendants flexibility to determine how best to meet the 
goal of the law and to adapt their activities over time as new technology develops 
to reduce emissions. 
The first instance of a performance-based remedy in the consumer fraud 
context appears to have been in the Hawaiian Punch case. The remedial order in 
that case ordered the manufacturer to add a disclosure of the product’s actual 
fruit juice content to advertising and labels, but permitted the defendant to 
remove the disclosure after one year if it had substantially eliminated consumer 
confusion about the fruit juice content of the product.140 To substantially 
eliminate consumer confusion, the order gave the defendant two options. One 
option was to reformulate the product to contain primarily fruit juice, thus 
bringing it into conformity with the mistaken consumer beliefs that defendant’s 
deception had engendered. The other option was to demonstrate through 
consumer survey evidence that no more than specified benchmark proportions 
of consumers were confused about the drink’s fruit juice content.141 
Not only do courts and enforcement agencies have experience with 
performance-based remedies, but many firms themselves have employed 
performance-based approaches in various aspects of their businesses. Thus, using 
performance benchmarks to change business practices will come quite naturally 
to most twenty-first-century firms.  
As previously explained, firms today increasingly take a performance-based 
approach to the design of everything from websites to products, setting 
performance goals and experimenting to improve and adapt marketing, pricing, 
product design, etc. Paralleling this change in design practices has been the 
adoption of performance-based business management practices. To achieve “a 
 
 137.  Id. at 538–41. 
 138.  Id. at 500 (stating “[t]he order leaves the choice of means to reduce overcrowding to the 
discretion of state officials,” and suggesting that the state would likely employ new construction, out-of-
state transfers, and early release).  
 139.  See, e.g., S. Coal Consent Decree, supra note 123, at ¶¶ 39–41 (ordering defendants to hire a 
third-party environmental auditor to assess defendants’ compliance in meeting specified environmental 
performance benchmarks set forth in the order). 
 140.  In the Matter of RJR Foods, Inc., et al., 83 F.T.C. 7, *4–*5 (1973). 
 141.  Id. 
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state of more or less continuous adaptation to fluid environments,” business 
management has evolved from a hierarchical system to one that facilitates 
dispersed decisionmaking accountable to measurable performance outcomes.142 
“What you measure is what you get” has been an accepted principle in the 
business management world for some time.143 More recently, the American 
Management Association found that one of the key drivers of high performing 
businesses is clearly defined performance measures.144 These measures are 
accompanied by incentives to encourage employees or units within firms to 
creatively experiment to discover the best ways to meet them.145  
Performance-based remedies similarly set performance goals but operate at 
the firm level rather than the employee or business-unit level. These remedies 
provide defendant firms with the incentives and flexibility needed to meet those 
goals. In fact, complying with customer confusion and consequences injunctions 
might well lead firms to set their own internal performance targets and assign 
employees or business units the task of meeting those targets. 
B. Mechanics 
How can enforcement agencies and courts construct customer confusion and 
consequences benchmarks, structure audit procedures, and ensure compliance? 
The following answers each of these questions in turn. 
1. Benchmarks 
A performance-based remedial order must select a benchmark against which 
the defendant’s performance in eradicating the effects of its fraud is assessed. In 
cases of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices, a total prohibition on customer 
confusion or ill consequences—in effect a benchmark of zero—might seem 
attractive. Courts and enforcement agencies are likely to be uncomfortable 
admitting that their orders may not remedy the harm inflicted on some customers 
by defendants. Moreover, substantial reductions in erroneous consumer beliefs 
are possible when a party with good access to the affected consumers is 
committed to addressing the problem. An example occurred when Consumer 
Reports released erroneous information about some children’s car seats. The 
organization’s subsequent effort to correct misimpressions among car seat 
purchasers was quite successful.146 
 
 142.  Achrol & Kotler, supra note 25, at 148. 
 143.  See, e.g., Robert S. Kaplan & David Norton, The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive 
Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 1992), https://hbr.org/1992/01/the-balanced-scorecard-measures-
that-drive-performance-2 [https://perma.cc/S7N8-YAUT]. 
 144.  How to Build a High-Performance Organization, AM. MGMT. ASS’N 1, 23 (2007). 
 145.  See, e.g., Marcus Buckingham & Ashley Goodall, Reinventing Performance Management, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/04/reinventing-performance-management 
[https://perma.cc/V9GJ-8D4S] (explaining nonfinancial performance measures successfully used by a 
major accounting firm). 
 146.  See generally Uri Simonsohn, Lessons From an Oops at Consumer Reports: Consumers Follow 
Experts and Ignore Invalid Information, 48 J. MKTG. RES. 1 (2011). 
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In the Consumer Reports case, the misinformation was spread for only two 
weeks. When a defendant has engaged in unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices 
for months or years, eradicating all customer confusion and ill consequences is 
not realistic, and likely poses more costs than it is worth. Some consumers who 
view the most convincing marketing will not buy, and some consumers who play 
the most educational video game will remain stubbornly confused. Even the most 
consumer-friendly website design could allow a distracted, multitasking 
consumer to click the wrong button and thereby mistakenly enroll in a service or 
purchase a product. 
The FTC’s order in the Hawaiian Punch case is also not particularly helpful 
for selecting performance benchmarks. That order required defendants to meet 
at least one of three benchmarks regarding the proportion of consumers who 
knew that the drink contained less than 20% juice: 67% of all fruit-drink 
consumers, 80% of prospective Hawaiian Punch customers, or 95% of customers 
who had purchased Hawaiian Punch in the last month.147 However, the 
Commission provided no public rationale for the benchmarks selected. It is also 
unclear why one of the benchmarks included all fruit-drink purchasers. Though 
a firm’s deception of its own customers might unintentionally benefit its 
competitors, the firm has ample incentive to remedy that deception without a 
court order. Only a firm’s actual customers ought to be the subject of a 
performance benchmark. 
A more justifiable benchmark for a customer confusion injunction could be 
borrowed from Federal Trade Commission Act deception cases148 and Lanham 
Act deceptive trade practice cases.149 In FTC Act cases, the FTC need not provide 
survey evidence to prove deception, but where it does provide such evidence, 
courts have generally found that if a firm misleads 10% to 15% of consumers, the 
firm has engaged in deception.150 In Lanham Act cases, a plaintiff competitor 
must demonstrate through consumer surveys that consumers have been misled 
by the defendant firm’s practices. The Lanham Act cases have roughly settled on 
a 7.5% to 15% consumer confusion rate as being an acceptable benchmark for 
plaintiffs to demonstrate before courts will impose liability on defendant 
competitors for deceptive trade practices.151 These benchmarks could transfer 
well to the performance-based remedy context. 
Another benchmark might be the median market-wide consumer confusion 
or ill-consequences rate for the type of product, feature, or process at issue.152 
 
 147.  In the Matter of RJR Foods, Inc., et al., 83 F.T.C. 7, *6 (1973). 
 148.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 149.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
 150.  See. e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(upholding FTC’s finding of deception where “15% (or 10%) of the buying public” was misled by the 
defendant’s marketing). 
 151.  See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms. 
Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 134 (3d Cir. 1994) (using a 7.5% benchmark); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v Johnson 
& Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002) (using a 15% benchmark). 
 152.  This rate would need to be established through market-wide consumer testing. Cf. Amy 
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More aggressively, an enforcement agency might identify top industry 
performers, those firms with relatively few customers who are confused about or 
who are suffering ill effects from the product or process at issue, and demand that 
firms caught defrauding their customers minimize their customers’ confusion or 
ill consequences to a similar extent. This is akin to environmental regulations, 
which are often set based on the performance achievable by the currently best 
available technology.153 
Selecting a performance benchmark for a remedial order is more of an art 
than a science. In the California prison unconstitutional conditions case in which 
the Supreme Court recently upheld a performance-based remedy, the lower 
court ordered the state to achieve an inmate population density of 137.5% of 
prison design capacity within two years, but admitted that the benchmark that 
would satisfy the Constitution was not capable of scientific determination.154 
Nonetheless, any of the performance benchmarks discussed above are more 
justifiable than an information or practices injunction that sets no benchmark for 
the reductions in customer confusion and ill consequences that the defendant 
must achieve.  
2. Audits 
Once a benchmark is selected, establishing an audit scheme for enforcing a 
confusion or consequences injunction is straightforward. Confusion audits are 
routinely used in Lanham Act cases, following the same generally accepted 
practices used in the consumer studies field.155 As explained in the Federal 
Judicial Center’s Manual on Scientific Evidence, these practices include proper 
sampling techniques, clear and precise non-leading questions and answers, 
rotating question and answer orders, avoidance of nonresponse bias, and robust 
statistical analysis.156 The questions themselves might be true/false, fill-in-the-
blank, or multiple-choice tests; a consumer survey expert would need to 
determine the right type of questions to use in each case.157 Valid inferences will 
often be possible with small random samples of the defendant’s customers.158 
Customer consequences audits will vary depending on the manner in which 
those consequences can be observed. Sometimes a consumer survey would reveal 
 
Kapczynski & Ian Ayres, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1830 (2015) (proposing a median market-wide performance measure be imposed on 
car manufacturers with respect to accidental deaths of or serious injuries to car occupants). 
 153.  See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 
795, 819 (2005). 
 154.  Three-Judge Court Opinion and Order, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 THE, *124–*30 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2009/08/04/Opinion%20&%20 
Order%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VKH-YZCX]. 
 155.  See generally Kenneth A. Plevan, Recent Trends in the Use of Surveys in Advertising and 
Consumer Deception Disputes, 15 CHI-KENT J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 1 (2016). 
 156.  THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 387–89 
(3d ed. 2011). 
 157.  See, e.g., Plevan, supra note 155, at 84–88 (citing cases). 
 158.  Id. at 81–82. 
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the pertinent consequences; sometimes defendant’s records alone would show 
whether the defendant’s illegal practices continued to harm its customers. In the 
example of a defendant that has tricked customers into unwittingly purchasing a 
product or service, a consequences audit could involve reviewing the defendant’s 
records to observe whether customers who bought the product or service used it 
as that product or service is normally used, thereby demonstrating an intent to 
have purchased it. The audit could also include surveying a random sample of the 
defendant’s customers to assess whether the customers intended to buy the 
product or service. 
Auditors must be qualified independent third-party experts approved by the 
enforcement agency and paid for by the defendant, the same process used for 
information and practices injunction auditors.159 Auditors might include 
consultants or academics who currently perform similar testing for research, 
marketing, or litigation purposes. Enforcement agencies would need to perform 
some auditing of these auditors,160 but auditors should be professionals self-
interested in maintaining a reputation for accuracy and independence. 
3. Ensuring Compliance 
To ensure compliance with customer confusion and consequences 
injunctions, remedial orders must give defendants an incentive to meet the 
benchmarks expeditiously. The effectiveness of the Hawaiian Punch remedial 
order was impaired by a lack of such an incentive. As discussed above, the order 
required the defendant to disclose the drink’s fruit juice content in advertising 
and on product labels for one year, after which the firm had three options: 
continue to make the fruit juice content disclosures; reformulate the product to 
contain 100% fruit juice; or demonstrate through audits that consumers were no 
longer confused about the product’s fruit juice content.161 
Apparently adding the fruit juice content disclosures was not particularly 
onerous, giving the defendant no incentive to reformulate the product or 
disabuse consumers of the false beliefs instilled by the defendant’s previous 
deceptive advertising. Unsurprisingly, the order failed to wipe out the lingering 
effects of the company’s deception; nearly ten years later, after significant 
publicity about the paucity of fruit juice in “fruit drinks,” only about 70% of 
Hawaiian Punch purchasers realized that the product contained less than 20% 
fruit juice.162 
Remedial decrees in the environmental area have aggressively managed the 
potential for noncompliance by setting stipulated penalties, sometimes thousands 
of dollars a day, for failures to meet ordered performance benchmarks.163 Courts 
 
 159.  See, e.g., S. Coal Consent Decree, supra note 123, at ¶ 30. 
 160.  Cf. Audit Requirements for Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, supra note 129 
(explaining that third parties audit children’s products to ensure that the products comply with applicable 
child safety rules, and that the Consumer Product Safety Commission audits these auditors). 
 161.  In the Matter of RJR Foods, Inc., et al., 83 F.T.C. 7, *4–*5 (1973). 
 162.  Kinnear et al., supra note 12, at 40. 
 163.  S. Coal Consent Decree, supra note 123, at ¶¶ 85–89. 
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and enforcement agencies fashioning confusion and consequences injunctions 
might adopt a similar approach. For deterring noncompliance in the consumer 
fraud context, stipulated non-financial penalties might be more effective and a 
better fit than fines. For example, a defendant might be prohibited from selling 
the products or services or using the marketing channels implicated in the 
defendant’s wrongdoing until it meets its benchmark. Alternatively, a defendant 
might be required to disgorge profits each month from sales of the products about 
which it had deceived consumers or sales made through the channels through 
which it had engaged in unfair or abusive practices, until the defendant meets its 
benchmarks. 
In addition, remedial orders should specify that defendants must pay not only 
for third-party audits necessary to assess compliance with confusion and 
consequences injunctions, but also fees and costs enforcement agencies incur to 
enforce the orders.164 Defendants must pay these expenses to internalize the cost 
of their wrongdoing to the greatest possible extent. 
Finally, past experience with performance-based management and regulation 
has demonstrated the importance of selecting the right performance measures. 
Business scholars have discovered that performance measures must be difficult 
for managers and employees to game and should be as close as possible to the 
end goal desired by the firm.165 The same lesson was learned by the 
Environmental Protection Agency when it first began requiring that factories 
keep within specified emissions performance limits. Firms built higher 
smokestacks so that the emissions monitors at ground level would produce lower 
pollution level readings, allowing the firms to pass the tests without reducing their 
emissions. Regulators responded by changing testing methods to take both 
ground level emissions readings and smokestack height into account.166 
In light of these experiences, courts and enforcement agencies ought not to 
rely exclusively on audit results to assess compliance with performance-based 
remedies. Defendants should be required to report the changes they made that 
led to the improved performance, so that the agencies can check whether any 
performance measures have been gamed. 
C. Advantages Of Performance-Based Remedies 
Confusion and consequences injunctions are likely to be more effective and 
more efficient than information and practices injunctions. Firms today have the 
skills, tools, and access necessary to influence their customers’ beliefs and actions. 
Confusion and consequences injunctions give defendants the incentive to 
 
 164.  Cf. Consent Decree of Civil Penalty and Permanent Injunction, United States v. Gerber 
Legendary Blades, No. 3:14-CV-2061-KI, ¶ III.H (D. Or. Jan. 6, 2015) (“The United States may seek 
reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees upon succeeding in a suit to enforce this Decree.”). 
 165.  See, e.g., John R. Hauser & Gerald M. Katz, Metrics: You Are What You Measure!, 16 EUR. 
MGMT. J. 517 (1998). 
 166.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AIR QUALITY: INFORMATION ON TALL 
SMOKESTACKS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO INTERSTATE TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTION 2 (2011). 
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redeploy these capabilities from committing fraud to eradicating the confusion 
and ill consequences wrought by their fraud. Performance-based remedies are 
also likely to have deterrent value in addition to remedial value, and the deterrent 
effects are likely to be well-calibrated to the quantum of harm caused by the 
defendants. 
Confusion and consequences injunctions are likely to be more effective than 
information and practices injunctions because they flip defendants’ incentives 
from undermining to achieving the remedial order’s goal of eradicating the 
effects of defendants’ fraud. These remedies also put defendants, parties much 
better-suited than courts or enforcement agencies to the task, in charge of 
determining how to eliminate the confusion and ill consequences those 
defendants have wrought. 
For example, recall that the PayPal Credit case was resolved with a twentieth-
century consent decree, containing only fines, disgorgement, and information and 
practices injunctions, all of which seemed unlikely to have much effect. In 
particular, the information PayPal was required to disclose and the practices it 
was required to engage in were uniform for all types of customers and static for 
the duration of the order. But influencing consumers’ beliefs and actions is best 
achieved using the real-time, personalized, experimentally based, evolving 
approach perfected by twenty-first century fair and fraudulent sales practices. A 
remedial order enjoining the defendant from charging more than a de minimis 
proportion of its customers’ payments to PayPal Credit accounts without those 
customers’ knowing consent would have given the defendant the incentive to 
continuously redesign a variety of personally targeted payment interfaces to 
prevent its customers from using PayPal Credit unwittingly. 
Another benefit of performance-based remedies is that they give defendants 
the flexibility to find the most cost-effective way to eliminate their customers’ 
confusion and ill consequences. In confusion cases, the defendant can select 
whether to bring the product into conformity with its customers’ beliefs or to 
bring its customers’ beliefs into conformity with the existing product. In cases 
where ill consequences are the problem, the defendant can select whether, for 
example, to do more to help consumers self-select the product appropriately, to 
stop offering the product to consumers for whom the product is unsuitable, or to 
sell the product to all consumers but to then unwind a transaction if the 
customer’s use demonstrates the product’s unsuitability.  
For example, in a situation like the Hawaiian Punch case, where a defendant 
has deceived its customers about the ingredients in its product, an apt remedy 
would be to require the defendant to end that confusion by ensuring that 
substantially all of its customers know the truth about those ingredients. One 
technique a defendant might use would be to inform its customers about the 
ingredients in creative ways—contests or catchy advertising jingles, for 
example—continually experimenting to find the best way to tailor its method of 
informing each customer. If the product is sold online, a defendant might even 
create a “find-the-ingredients” video game or an “ingredient-smarts” quiz and 
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redesign the purchase process so that customers must play the game or pass the 
quiz along the way to buying the product. Alternatively, or in addition, a 
defendant that has deceived its customers about the ingredients in its product 
could reformulate the product to contain the ingredients the defendant had led 
its customers to expect.167 
In the PayPal case, a customer consequences injunction would have given 
PayPal the flexibility to select ways to eliminate unintentional uses of PayPal 
Credit that might vary by customer. For some customers, the defendant’s testing 
might have found the pre-existing payment interfaces to be sufficient. For other 
customers, PayPal might have developed payment interfaces that by their design 
were more informative or made it easier for the customer to select her transaction 
account rather than a credit account. For those customers who continued to 
unwittingly select credit—perhaps customers who mistakenly tap the wrong 
button on a small device screen when trying to make purchases using a 
transaction account—the defendant might have found that the most cost-
effective alternative was to stop offering credit as a payment option on devices 
with small touch screens. 
Firms have better information about their own products, processes, and 
customers than do enforcement agencies, and thus can find the most efficient mix 
of techniques to eliminate their customers’ confusion and ill consequences. Just 
as marketing, purchase and return processes, price structures, and products and 
services themselves can be designed to maximize firm profits, so too can all of 
these be designed to dispel consumer confusion and minimize ill consequences 
and, within those constraints, maximize firm profits. 
Economic modeling broadly supports this conclusion with respect to 
consumer confusion. One scholar recently demonstrated that requiring firms to 
narrow the gap between consumers’ beliefs about credit card and mortgage terms 
and the true terms of those products, under plausible conditions in most 
consumer markets, likely increases both social welfare and consumer surplus.168 
A recent settlement agreement in a private class action is also instructive here. 
A class of customers sued Naked Juice Company for misrepresenting that its 
juices were “non-GMO” and “all natural” when they allegedly contained 
genetically modified ingredients and synthetic vitamins.169 Presumably using its 
own calculations about how to maximize its profits without deceiving consumers, 
the defendant in settlement negotiations agreed to different remedies for the two 
 
 167.  Recall that these were two of the defendant’s options in the Hawaiian Punch case, but they were 
not binding because the defendant was able to select a third option of disclosing the product’s fruit juice 
content on advertisements and product labels instead. The option selected by the defendant—a 
twentieth-century information injunction—was not very effective. 
 168.  Alexei Alexandrov, Making Firms Liable for Consumers’ Mistaken Beliefs: Theoretical Model 
and Empirical Applications to the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Card Markets 2–3, 16, 17 & 29 (Sept. 22, 
2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2599424 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2599424. 
 169.  Pepsico To No Longer Call Naked Juices ‘Natural,’ USA TODAY (July 26, 2013), https://www 
.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/26/pepsi-co-naked-juice-not-natural/2589717/#, [https://per 
ma.cc/7TSH-ERYR]. 
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misrepresentations it had allegedly been making. For the “non-GMO” false 
claim, the firm agreed to a practice injunction forbidding it from using GMO 
ingredients.170 In effect, the defendant agreed to eliminate customer confusion by 
bringing the product into conformance with the previously mistaken (but now 
true) beliefs of its customers. As previously noted, the company also agreed to 
hire an independent third-party expert to perform audits to ensure that the 
defendant was no longer putting GMO ingredients into the product. 
To address the second misrepresentation, the defendant agreed to change the 
false “all-natural” representation rather than changing the product. It agreed to 
an information injunction requiring it to remove the “all-natural” claim from its 
labels.171 Presumably, the defendant performed calculations about how demand 
would be affected by removing the “all-natural” false claim and the cost of 
changing to all-natural vitamin sources, and decided that removing the claim was 
the more profitable course of action. A customer confusion injunction would 
almost certainly have been more effective at eliminating lingering false customer 
beliefs about the source of the vitamins in the defendant’s juices because the 
injunction would have given the defendant an incentive to affirmatively correct 
the misimpression its deceptive label had created. But that aside, the lesson from 
the Naked Juice settlement is that a firm has better access than do enforcement 
officials to information needed to decide which strategies to employ to reduce 
customer confusion and ill consequences at the least cost to the firm. 
In addition to being effective and efficient at preventing defendants from 
continuing to confuse and inflict ill consequences on their customers, customer 
confusion and consequences injunctions prevent defendants from continuing to 
benefit from the lingering effects of their past illegal practices. Performance-
based remedies thus have not only direct incapacitation value, but also 
deterrence value because they deflate the predicted returns to defendants of 
committing unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. 
Moreover, the cost of complying with these remedial provisions could itself 
be a deterrent to committing fraud. Third-party expert auditors are not free; 
recall that the price of the auditor in the case against Education Management 
Services for student enrollment fraud was expected to be as much as one million 
dollars annually for three to five years. 
Disabusing customers of erroneous beliefs previously instilled by the 
defendant is likely to be as costly if not more costly than the marketing the 
defendant previously used to instill those false beliefs. Altering firm culture and 
habits—and the algorithms employed to design marketing, sales and return 
processes, pricing, and products—to prioritize minimizing customer ill 
consequences over immediate sales and profits is unlikely to be cheap.172 
 
 170.  Naked Juice Settlement, supra note 128, at ¶ 50(a). 
 171.  Id. at ¶ 50(d). 
 172.  See, e.g., John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, 59 HARV. BUS. 
REV. 1 (1995), reprinted at HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2007), https://hbr.org/2007/01/leading-change-why-
transformation-efforts-fail [https://perma.cc/9PK2-RLLV] (documenting difficulty of changing corporate 
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Sometimes small, inexpensive changes can have large effects. But finding those 
small changes is not easy because the effects of many changes are not predictable 
without testing. Compliance costs for performance-based remedies, therefore, 
will often be high enough to have some deterrent value themselves. 
Finally, recall the normatively suspect lottery effect that would occur if only 
those few firms that enforcement agencies have the resources to pursue were 
faced with large, deterrent-level fines. This is one reason fines imposed in cases 
of unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices are too low to deter. In contrast, 
performance-based remedies—enjoining defendants from continuing to take 
advantage of their customers—are normatively justified. The punishment fits the 
crime, so to speak. 
Customer confusion and consequences injunctions are well-calibrated 
remedies because compliance costs are likely to be proportional to the ill-gotten 
benefits that defendants previously reaped from their fraud. The cost of undoing 
the effects of a brief deceptive marketing campaign is likely to be at the lower 
end of the spectrum. In contrast, a defendant that has spent decades engendering 
and exploiting its customers’ confusion will need to spend serious time and 
money enlightening its customers. 
Customer consequences injunctions are likely to be similarly well-calibrated. 
For example, redesigning purchase processes that were previously honed to trick 
customers into undesired transactions is likely to be quite expensive when the 
website or application platforms on which the purchase process was running were 
optimized along many dimensions, adaptively personalized in real time to trick a 
range of consumers. In contrast, a simple pre-checked box is likely to have tricked 
fewer consumers and to have been less lucrative for the defendant, but 
eradicating erroneous customer transactions resulting from a pre-checked box is 
also likely to be inexpensive to do. 
Change is always difficult. Business managers had to push back against 
entrenched internal constituencies when they shifted from hierarchically 
managed, highly controlled firm operations to flexible performance-based 
management.173 But changing to performance-based systems has been worth the 
transition costs for firms. So too replacing information and practices injunctions 
with performance-based customer confusion and consequences injunctions will 
be worthwhile for courts and consumer protection enforcement agencies 
committed to redressing and deterring fraud. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Performance-based remedies to address twenty-first-century unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive practices are overdue. A firm today would never set the 
design of marketing, sales and return processes, pricing, or products in stone. 
 
culture and habits). 
 173.  Achrol & Kotler, supra note 25, at 147. 
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Courts and enforcement agencies today ought not to be satisfied with remedial 
orders that dictate static changes in a defendant’s marketing, processes, pricing, 
or products either. 
Performance-based remedies enlist defendants to eradicate the confusion and 
ill consequences their illegal practices have created. By giving defendants the 
flexibility and the responsibility to meet required benchmarks in whatever way 
they see fit, confusion and consequences injunctions requisition the very twenty-
first-century tools and capacities defendants use to defraud, and redeploy these 
tools and capacities to end and reverse the fraud’s ill effects. Requiring 
defendants to pay for audits to demonstrate their compliance with these remedies 
makes defendants pay much of the law-enforcement costs occasioned by their 
violation of the law. 
As a recent book by Nobel-prize winning economists George Akerlof and 
Robert Shiller has explained, “[C]ompetitive markets by their very nature spawn 
deception and trickery, as a result of the same profit motives that give us our 
prosperity.”174 Consumer protection law is one of the few bulwarks society has 
against this cost of a largely free market. 
Increasing enforcement agency resources could go a long way toward making 
consumer-law enforcement more effective, thereby reducing unfairness, 
deception, and abuse. But given limited resources, customer confusion and 
consequences injunctions monitored through third-party audits paid for by firms 
are a promising solution. 
 
 
 174.  GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF 
MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION 165 (2015). 
